Lloyd Lewis v. Lynn S. Porter, dba Lynn S. Porter House Movers : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Lloyd Lewis v. Lynn S. Porter, dba Lynn S. Porter
House Movers : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Preston, Harris, Harris and Preston; George W. Preston; Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant.
Olson, Hoggan and Sorenson; David W. Sorenson; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Lewis v. Porter, No. 14486.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/336
UTAH UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
4S.9 
.S9 
DOCKET NO., 
BRIEF 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Subject 1 
Statement of Kind of Case 1 
Disposition in Lower Court 2 
Relief Sought on Appeal 2 
Statement of Facts 2 
Argument 5 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN-
REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RE-
OPEN THE CASE OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A 
NEW TRIAL AND DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN SO DOING 5 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
ENTERED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT AGAINST LYNN S. PORTER dba 
LYNN S. PORTER HOUSE MOVERS, AN INDIVIDUAL, 
AS THE DEFENDANT ENTERED THE CONTRACT AS AN 
INDIVIDUAL, ADMITTED HIS CAPACITY TO BE SUED 
INDIVIDUALLY ANT) FAILED TO RAISE TIMELY 
OBJECTIONS THERETO 12 
Conclusion ;- 17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i i 
:
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
C o n t i n u e d 
Page 
CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES CITED 
Anderson v. Johnson, 268 P.2d 427, 1 Utah 2d 400 
(1954) 5 
Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700 (Utah, 1974) 10 
Buhler v. Maddison, 166 P.2d 205, 109 Utah 245 
(1946) 15 
Huber v. Newman, 145 P.2d 780, 106 Utah 363 
(1944) 16 
Hydraulic Cement Block Co. v. Christensen, 114 
Pac. 524, 38 Utah 525 (1911) 8 
McFarland's Estate v. Holt, 417 P.2d 244, 18 Utah 
2d 127 (1966) 13 
Pocock v. Deniz, 286 P.2d 466, 134 C.A.2d 758 
(1955) 10 
Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Stoutt, 180 Pac. 182, 54 
Utah 100 (1919) 8 
Skeens v. Kroh, 489 P.2d 347, 30 Col. App. 88 
• (1971) 14 
Steele v. Wilkinson, 349 P.2d 1117, 10 Utah 2d
 t 
159 (1960) 16 
Tuft v. Brotherson, 150 P.2d 384, 106 Utah 499 
(1944) 9, 10 
Van Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 161 Pac. 50, 48 
Utah 606 (1916) 8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Continued 
TEXTS CITED 
59 Am.Jur.2d, "Parties," Sec. 264, p. 729--
61 Am.Jur.2d, "Pleading," Sec. 177, p. 604-
Page 
- 15 
- 13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD LEWIS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LYNN S. PORTER, dba 
LYNN S. PORTER HOUSE MOVERS, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Case No. 14486 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a civil action brought by Plaintiff to recover 
monies due and owing Plaintiff under an oral contract for 
services rendered to Defendant, In this brief Appellant 
shall be referred to as Defendant and Respondent shall be 
referred to as Plaintiff. References to the Clerk's Tran-
script shall be designated CT and references to the 
Reporter's Transcript shall be designated TR. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
• The Court, sitting without a jury, gave judgment to 
Plaintiff on his Complaint in the amount of $9,078.77 plus 
costs. From this judgment, Defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the judgment of the 
trial court in his favor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since 1947, Defendant had employed Plaintiff on various 
occasions as a laborer and foreman in moving houses and 
buildings for Defendant. (TR 31). In May, 1973 Plaintiff 
was once again employed by Defendant to run an outfit and 
move new and older houses. (TR 7, 8). 
Pursuant to the agreement between the parties, Plaintiff 
moved a substantial number of new and older homes between 
June 1 and December 23, 1973. (TR 24, 25). As the work 
proceeded, Defendant withheld sums of monies from the Plain-
tiff and refused to pay Plaintiff even though demand was made 
by Plaintiff upon Defendant for payment. (TR 30). Defendant 
terminated the agreement on or about the 23rd day of 
December, 1973. (TR 10). 
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On March 20, 1974, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the 
above entitled matter, (CT 1). On April 6, 1974, Defendant 
filed his Answer. (CT 5). Depositions of the parties were 
taken on April 17, 1975. (CT 14A). Defendant's counsel, 
Hillyard & Gunnell, Gordon J. Low, withdrew as attorneys for 
Defendant on October 20, 1975. (CT 7). Defendant's present 
counsel gave Notice of Change of Attorney on October 22, 
1975. (CT 8). A Notice of Readiness for Trial was filed 
with tfhe Clerk of said Court (CT 9), and on October 24, 
1975, the Clerk gave Notice of Trial Setting with a second 
setting on December 3, 1975. (CT 10). On November 19, 
1975, the Clerk gave notice that the Court would hear the 
matter on December 3, 1975. (CT 11). 
On December 3, 1975, the Court convened for the trial 
of the case. Plaintiff was present together with his witnesses 
and was represented by his attorneys, Olson, Hoggan & 
Sorenson, David W. Sorenson. Defendant was not present, but 
was represented by his attorneys, Preston, Harris, Harris & 
Preston, George W. Preston. (CT 12). Defendant's counsel 
represented to the Court that he had advised the Defendant 
of the trial date and could not explain the absence of his 
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client except to state that Defendant had gone on vacation 
and asked for a continuance. (TR 3). Plaintiff's counsel 
objected to the continuance. The Court denied Defendant's 
motion, and the trial proceeded. (TR 4). 
The trial was concluded on December 4, 1975, and at the 
conclusion of the case, the trial court while still sitting 
on the bench rendered a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and 
against the Defendant for the sum of $9,078.77, together 
with costs of Court. (TR 87, 88). On December 10, 1975, 
Plaintiff's counsel forwarded to Defendant's attorney the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Judgment 
and Decree for signature for approval as to form. (CT 15-19). 
On December 11, 1975, the Defendant filed a Motion to Reopen or 
in the Alternative for a New Trial. (CT 22). On the same 
day the Motion was filed, the Court signed the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Laxv and the Judgment and Decree. 
(CT 17, 18). Plaintiff responded in opposition to Defendant's 
Motion and on January 20, 1976 (CT 25), the Court denied the 
Defendant's Motion. (CT 34, 36). On February 19, 1976, 
Defendant filed.his Notice of Appeal, requesting that the 
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Supreme Court of the State of Utah review the District 
Court's refusal to reopen the case or in the alternative 
grant a new trial. (CT 40). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING TO GRANT DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION TO REOPEN THE CASE OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
FOR A NEW TRIAL AND DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SO 
DOING. 
Defendant alleges that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying his Motion to Reopen or in the 
Alternative for a New Trial, The burden to shoxtf an abuse 
lies upon the party claiming the abuse. Anderson v. 
Johnson, 268 P.2d 427, 1 Utah 2d 400 (1954). The Defendant 
elected to take a vacation to Hawaii rather than appear 
for trial. 
,r
. . . I advised Mr, Porter, the defendant, of 
the trial date, and apparently notwithstanding 
the fact that Ifd advised him there must be 
some mixup, because I thought he was advised of 
the trial date, yet he is obviously taking a 
vacation, which seems absolutely Inconsistent 
with his best interests. I can't imagine a 
man knowingly taking a vacation having recog-
nized he had his obligation to be in court, 
and particularly considering the sum involved." 
(TR 3). 
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UQ And you!ve heard counsel's testimony that 
, he is in Hawaii? A Yes, sir." (TR 20, 
"
2 1 > -
MThat at said time I had made prior arrangements 
to go on a vacation with my family to Hawaii." 
(CT 23). 
Defendant now claims that such conduct should be excused 
and that the Court should have allowed him additional trial 
time to present his testimony. In his Affidavit for his 
Motion before the Court, Defendant alleges that: 
1. He had already planned to go to Hawaii and 
that his attorney was entering into negotiations 
and that the trial was not ready because the 
Defendant had not turned over certain materials 
to Plaintiff's attorney as requested, 
2. He had offsets and claims which were not 
presented because Defendant did not know what 
was needed until the trial, and 
3. That certain witnesses were not known until 
Plaintiff's testimony. (CT 23, 24). (Emphasis 
added). 
The essential claims made by the Defendant relate, in 
actuality, to the conduct of the Defendant not the Plaintiff. 
At the time of trial, Defendant1s attorney rather than saying 
that the continuance should be granted because of pending or 
continuing negotiations between the parties, or that the 
Defendant had failed to discover additional facts and 
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witnesses, stated that he xvas at a loss to explain why 
the Defendant was not present in Court. (TR 3). 
Defendant had nearly 21 months to discover the evidence 
and witnesses that the Plaintiff would produce; yet, it was 
not until after the trial was over that Defendant made any 
allegation as to the need for additional discovery. (CT 22). 
The trial court issued its Memorandum Decision on January 20, 
1976, in response to Defendant's Motions and stated: 
"The defendant filed a motion to reopen 
or in the alternative for a new trial on the 
grounds the defendant claims that he assumed 
the trial would not be held and went on vaca-
tion. There is nothing in the record to show 
that he could make any such assumption. And 
on the further grounds that certain books, 
records, and documents need to be examined 
and that it was not knox^ n in a discovery pro-
cedure that such was needed until the time of 
trial. 
The action was commenced March 20, 1974, 
and was tried on December 3, 1975, nearly 
two years later. It would appear that the 
defendant had ample time for whatever dis-
covery was needed prior to trial and he could 
have determined what books, records, and 
documents the plaintiff was relying on to 
support his claim.n (CT 34). 
Certainly, Defendant failed to use reasonable diligence 
in producing his evidence at the time of trial, and such 
diligence is necessary for a Motion for New Trial. In the 
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case of Hydraulic Cement Block Co. v. Christensen, 114 Pac. 524, 
38* Utah 525 (1911) the Court stated: 
l!Courts cannot grant nex^  trials merely because 
a defeated party, after an adverse decision, 
makes a showing that upon a second trial he can 
produce additional evidence in support of his 
contentions which will probably turn the decision 
in his favor. He must use due diligence to pro-
duce his evidence when the case comes on for 
trial, and, unless he does so, the court is 
powerless to help him. In this case there is 
no showing whatever that the plaintiff used 
any diligence to produce the alleged nex^ ly 
discovered evidence at the trial. The court, 
therefore, committed no error in overruling 
the motion for that reason," 114 Pac. at 526. 
See also Van Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 161 Pac. 50, 48 
Utah 606 (1916). And in Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Stoutt, 
180 Pac 182 the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
,T(3) But the serious question presented 
for our consideration is, Did the plaintiff 
use reasonable diligence to procure the pro-
posed testimony for use at the trial of the 
case? If he did not, it does not matter how 
material or beneficial the testimony may have 
been on a new trial, his motion for a new 
trial should not prevail. The statute in re-
lation to this ground for a new trial says: 
fNextfly discovered evidence, material for 
the party making the application, which he 
could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produced at the trial. ! lf 
(Emphasis by the Court.) 180 Pac. at 184. 
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It was the Defendant, by his own admission, (1) who 
chose a course of action which took him out of the state on 
vacation when he was to have been present for trial (CT 23)5 
(2) xtfho failed to present his alleged offsets and counter-
claims, (3) who failed to ascertain the witnesses necessary 
to his defense, and (4) who failed to raise what he now 
considers proper objections, in a timely fashion. He was 
represented by counsel, had his witnesses testify and has had 
his day in court; he cannot-now complain. 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly 
allows the trial court discretion as to whether it will 
reopen a case or not. This court has stated in Tuft v. 
Brotherson, 150 P.2d 384, 106 Utah 499 (1944), that a 
motion to reopen a case after the trial court has taken it 
under advisement but before it has announced its decision 
is addressed to the trial court's discretion; and, in 
absence of a showing that such discretion has been abused, 
the trial court1s ruling will not be disturbed. The same 
principle would certainly seem to apply in the present case 
where the trial court had announced its decision from the 
bench at the conclusion of the trial and before the Motion 
to Reopen was made. (CT 87, 88). In the instant case, the 
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court saw the witnesses and heard their testimony, made 
rulings during the trial and allowed and denied the ad-
mission of testimony and evidence. The trial court was 
close to the entire trial, and having taken into considera-
tion the total circumstances of the case, rendered its 
judgment and denied the Defendant's Motions. In Barber v.' 
Calder, 522 P.2d 700, 702 (1974), this Court, in discussing 
the deference to be given a trial court1s discretionary 
rulings, stated: 
tf
. . . In situations where the exercise of 
discretion is appropriate, considerable weight 
should be given to the determination of the 
trial court, whichever way it goes. This is 
true because due to his close involvement 
with the parties, the witnesses, and the 
total circumstances of the case, he is in 
the best position to judge what the interests 
of justice require in safeguarding the rights 
and interests of all parties concerned.11 
Finally, in addressing this specific point, the California 
Third District Court of Appeal, in a similar vein to that 
of this Court in the Tuft case, stated in Pocock v. Deniz, 
286 P.2d 466, 134 C.A.2d 758 (1955) that whether a motion 
to reopen a case after the close of the evidence should be 
granted rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, 
and it is seldom that the record will justify a reversal 
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of the judgment on the ground that error was committed in 
denying a motion to reopen. The court goes on to further 
elucidate this point and says: 
11
. . . (N)umerous cases have held that such a 
motion (to reopen) is properly denied, unless 
the court is satisfied that there is good 
excuse shox^ n why the evidence sought to be 
introduced after reopening could not have 
been produced before the close of the evidence. • .fr 
286 P. 2d at 469. Defendant has failed to meet this burden in 
the present case. 
The Defendant has failed to cite any specific grounds 
which support his allegation that the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to grant Defendant's Motion to Reopen 
or in the Alternative for a New Trial. Indeed, he has 
failed in his burden to show whereon any charge of abuse 
of discretion could be adequately founded. 
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court 
should sustain the trial court's denial of the Defendant's 
Motion to Reopen or in the Alternative for a Nex* Trial as 
no abuse of discretion x^ hatsoever is evident. 
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P.OINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ENTERED FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT AGAINST LYNN S. PORTER 
dba LYNN S. PORTER HOUSE MOVERS, AN-INDIVIDUAL, AS THE 
DEFENDANT ENTERED THE CONTRACT AS AN INDIVIDUAL, ADMITTED 
HIS CAPACITY TO BE SUED INDIVIDUALLY AND FAILED TO RAISE 
TIMELY OBJECTIONS THERETO. 
The Court's attention is respectfully directed to page 
8 of the Defendant's Brief, where it is alleged that the 
trial court erred in entering judgment against ". . . Plain-
tiff, Lynn S. Porter dba Lynn S. Porter Housemovers, an 
individual.!f The word "Defendant" was likely intended since 
the allegation as written is not correct. Judgment was 
entered for Lloyd Lewis, Plaintiff, and against Lynn S. 
Porter dba Lynn S. Porter House Movers, an individual, 
Defendant. (TR 87, 88 & CT 18). 
Assuming the Defendant meant to use the word "Defendant" 
as indicated above, it is submitted that the trial court was 
correct in entering judgment against the Defendant in his 
capacity as an individual* Two grounds of support for this 
contention are found in the law and the facts. 
First, the Defendant admitted that he was a proper 
party to the lawsuit and that he was being sued in a proper 
capacity when he filed an Answer to the Plaintiff1s Complaint 
and also in the Answer itself. 
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Plaintiff!s Complaint alleges as follows: 
"2. That on or about June 1, 1973, Plaintiff 
and Defendant entered into an Agreement whereby 
Plaintiff would render services to the Defendant 
in the form of moving houses for Defendant. 
3, That between June 1, 1973^  and December 31, 
1973, Plaintiff moved houses for Defendant for 
which Defendant agreed to pay the Plaintiff." 
(CT 1). 
Defendant's Answer to those allegations stated as 
follows: 
"3. Answering paragraph two, Defendant 
admits the same. 
4. Answering paragraph three, Defendant 
admits that Plaintiff moved houses between said 
dates but denies the balance of said paragraph." 
(CT 5 ) . . : S ; - .:• Y ? - . . . ^ : - - - , ••;•• " d -
It appears that the matter has been conclusively 
determined by Defendant's pleadings in this case. In 61 
Am.Jur.2d, "Pleading,11 p. 604, it is noted: 
"In thus pleading (to the merits or in bar), 
the defendant likewise admits the capacity 
in which he is sued." 
This Court has treated this issue in McFarland's Estate v. 
Holt, 417 P.2d 244, 18 Utah 2d 127 (1966). The Court 
said: 
"One Ttfho files a pleading asking the court to 
act thereon vouches for its verity and should 
not thereafter be permitted to repudiate it 
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for the purpose of upsetting the action the 
court has taken pursuant to his request.11 
417 P.2d at 245. 
The State of Colorado has taken the same position in 
Skeens v. Kroh, 489 P.2d 347, 30 Col. App. 88 (1971). It 
states: 
"Specific admissions in the pleadings preclude 
the pleader from later taking a position incon-
sistent with the existence of the facts admitted.11 
The second ground supporting the trial court's ruling 
is based on the fact that Defendant has raised no timely 
objection, as to the capacity in which he is sued. In fact 
the question of capacity was not raised during the trial 
nor, in any of Defendant's motions following trial. It 
was first raised in Defendant's Brief on appeal at page 8. 
Accordingly, Defendant should be deemed to have waived any 
objection to capacity. 
If the Defendant had disagreed with the allegations in 
the Plaintiff's Complaint, he had ample time to raise ob-
jections and avenues were open to him to respond to an 
alleged misjoinder or nonjoinder, i.e., Rules 8(b), (d) and 
12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The fact remains, 
however, that the Defendant admitted the relationship between 
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the parties in his Answer (CT 5); and the record is silent 
as to any motions or objections prior to or during the 
course of the trial. 
The following paragraphs demonstrate the stance of the 
law, and particularly the law in Utah, as it pertains to 
the failure to raise an objection to an alleged defect of 
parties. 
This Court addressed the matter in Buhler v. Maddison, 
166 P.2d 205, 109 Utah 245 (1946). The appellant had 
raised the objection of a defect of parties defendant. The 
Court found it to have been waived, however, as the cause 
had been tried twice before in the lower court and the same 
defect, if there was one, had been present and not raised. 
The fact that the present case has been tried only once in 
the lower court is not enough to take it out of the limits 
of the rule. The determinative factor is that no objection 
was raised below or at any time until now/ 
In 59 Am.Jur.2d, "Parties," p. 729, it states: 
"As a general rule, unless the defendant 
promptly raises the question of defect of par-
ties in the manner pointed out by the local 
practice provisions for taking objections to 
a defect of parties, he is deemed to waive the 
objection and it cannot be injected at a later 
stage of the proceedings." 
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In Steele v. Wilkinson, 349 P.2d .1117, 10 Utah 2d 
159 (1960), this Court dealt with the assignment of error 
in the giving of certain instructions to the jury, said 
assignment not being made in the lower court. The Court 
stated: 
!!
. . . Many of the objections now urged on 
appeal were not urged in the trial court 
and thus need not be considered by this 
court, there being no showing of special 
circumstances why these objections were 
not made below.n 
349 P.2d at 1119. 
Finally, in Huber v, Newman, 145 P.2d 780, 106 Utah 
363 (1944), this Court stated: 
11
 • . . It is elementary that when a party does 
not raise objections below when he had notice 
and opportunity to object, he may not be heard 
to complain for the first time on appeal. We 
hold, therefore, that the defendant waived all 
of these defects, if any there were, by failing 
to object below and we shall not further con-
sider them. . . .fl 
145 P.2d at 783. 
The trial court was correct in entering Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Laxtf and Judgment against Lynn S. Porter 
dba Lynn S. Porter House Movers, an individual, because 
Defendant has raised no objection whatsoever by way of 
pleadings, motion or oral protest from the filing of the 
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Complaint to the present appeal. Indeed, it seems clear 
that the relationship involved was that of a personal 
contract between the parties, irrespective of any other 
legal capacity the parties may have separately maintained. 
The trial courtTs action should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant, as an individual, entered into an agree-
ment with the Plaintiff, whereby the Defendant agreed to pay 
the Plaintiff to move houses for him. In addition to moving 
houses for the Defendant, the Plaintiff advanced costs for 
and on behalf of the Defendant. Timely demand was made 
upon the Defendant for sums due and owing the Plaintiff. 
The Defendant refused to pay the sums, and suit was filed 
therefor. At the conclusion of a trial on the merits and 
while the Court was still on the bench a judgment was 
entered for the Plaintiff and against the Defendant in the 
amount of $9,078.77, 
This judgment should be affirmed over the grounds urged 
by the Defendant for reversal. No abuse of discretion has 
been shown on the part of the trial court in refusing to 
reopen the case or in the alternative, In refusing to 
grant a motion for a new trial. The Defendant admitted his 
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capacity to be sued individually or in the alternative, 
waived any objection he might have to the capacity in which 
he is sued by failing to raise timely objection. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSON, HOGGAN & SORENSON 
^\^c^^f/<) • ^£-
David W. Sorensonr 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
56 West Center 
Logan, Utah 84321 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed ten (10) copies of the 
foregoing Respondent's Brief to Allen E. Mecham, Clerk of 
the Utah Supreme Court and two (2) copies to George W. 
Preston of Preston, Harris, Harris & Preston, Attorney for 
Defendant-Appellant, 31 Federal Avenue, Logan, Utah, 84321, 
on the// day of June, 1976. 
David W. Sorensc5n 
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